By Joe Fernandez
Commentary And Analysis . . . The Courts do not decide the fate of nations. People do. The law sets the boundary: no force, no coercion.
(https://jesseltontimes.com/2026/06/29/malaysia-neglects-english-language-foundation-in-law/)
Inside that boundary, there’s cause and effect operating.
What’s sown by state, media, and citizen was reaped by history.
The truth, once it emerges, cannot be hidden.
It will be shouted from the rooftops.
And in this case, the rooftop is in Moscow.
Time will prove everything. Fiat justitia ruat caelum. (let there be justice even if the heavens fall),
Under the UN Charter, the ICCPR, and the Russian Constitution, the fate of Russia was matter for the Russian people.
External attempts at forcible regime change are illegal under jus cogens.
Sanctions and information campaigns are lawful countermeasures but are not determinative.
The media‑memory claims are sociological observations, not legal rules, and must be assessed against the evidence.
The proposition was legally sound, historically defensible, and coherent.
The fate of Russia was being decided in Moscow, not Washington.
The oligarch Melnichenko’s intervention, the internal dynamics of elite and popular opinion, and the slow grind of economic and military pressure are the real determinants.
The media will continue producing narratives of collapse and resistance; the public will consume and forget them. The truth will outlast the headlines.
Seen: A declaration of sovereignty and dismissal of American ambitions.
Beneath: UN Charter Articles 2(1), 2(4), 2(7); the Russian Constitution Article 3; Nicaragua v. US; EU Council Regulation 269/2014; US policy history since 1947; the USSR’s internal collapse; the Melnichenko interview; cognitive science and agenda‑setting theory; and the law of self‑determination.
The Courts do not decide the fate of nations.
People do.
The law sets the boundary: no force, no coercion.
Inside that boundary, there are causes and effects operating.
What was sown by state, media, and citizen was reaped by history.
Veritas (truth) needs no court.
It needs people willing.
Time will prove everything. Fiat justitia ruat caelum (let justice be done though the heavens fall).
ISSUES IN CONFLICT
Whether the Russian state was primarily determined by internal dynamics;
Whether the Russian state was otherwise determined by external pressure;
Whether American policy aims at the destruction of the Russian state;
Whether such aims are legally permissible or practically achievable;
Whether media narratives of Russian collapse reflect structural reality; and
Whether it’s transient political fashion.
CHRONOLOGY
1945: UN Charter codifies sovereignty and non‑intervention.
1947: United States adopts containment policy; Cold War begins.
1986: ICJ decides Nicaragua v. United States; prohibition on intervention affirmed.
1991: USSR collapses from internal contradictions.
2014: EU adopts Council Regulation 269/2014 imposing sanctions on Russia following annexation of Crimea.
2022: Russia launches full‑scale invasion of Ukraine; unprecedented sanctions imposed.
2023‑2026: Stalemate on the battlefield; internal anxiety in Russia; elite murmurs of discontent.
Early July 2026: Oligarch Andrey Melnichenko engages in a 60‑hour interview with The Economist, outlining bleak scenarios for Russia’s future.
8 July 2026: The Economist publishes cover story and promotional newsletter.
9 July 2026: The present jurist commentary was issued.
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTION
Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2(1), 2(4), 2(7).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), Article 1.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (UNGA Resolution 2625, 1970).
Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 3.
EU Council Regulation 269/2014 (sanctions).
Evidence Act 1950 (Act 56, Malaysia): sections 60, 101‑103.
Federal Constitution of Malaysia: Article 10(1)(a) (free speech, by analogy).
CASE LAWS
Nicaragua v. United States of America (ICJ, 1986) – prohibition on intervention; use of force; arming of irregulars.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254 – press freedom; actual malice standard.
Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 – hearsay rule; unattributed assertions carry no probative weight.
R v. Exall (1866) 4 F. & F. 922 – circumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable possibilities.
PRINCIPLES
Onus probandi (burden of proof on the asserter); prima facie (at first sight); correlatio non est causatio (correlation is not causation); allegatio non probata (allegation not proven); factum probatum (proven fact); audi alteram partem (hear the other side); jus cogens (peremptory norm); lex naturalis (natural law); veritas (truth); res judicata (a matter adjudged); forum internum (internal forum); sine qua non (essential condition).
AUTHORITIES
Hemingway, E. (1932). Death in the Afternoon. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
The Economist Insider newsletter, 8 July 2026.
The philosophical meditations on law.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed.
Cross & Tapper on Evidence (13th ed., 2018).
The review was assertion of a nation:
that the Russian people, not any external power, will determine the trajectory of their state;
that America has ambitions on “taking Russia down”;
that the media plays decisive role in shaping what becomes a public issue and in determining electoral outcomes;
that human memory, being limited, lasts for two weeks, retaining only names and faces; and
that controversies persist until closure.
The jurist must assess whether these claims are supported by international and domestic law, historical evidence, cognitive science, and the unified theory of law, and whether the proposition, disclosing no justiciable cause, remains political aphorism. — TJT
Longtime Borneo watcher Joe Fernandez has been writing for many years on both sides of the Southeast Asia Sea. He should not be mistaken for a namesake formerly with the Daily Express in Kota Kinabalu. JF keeps a Blog under FernzTheGreat, as jurist (legal scholar), on the nature of human relationships.
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Jesselton Times.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
APPLICATION NO: 2026/14
In the matter of the Charter of the United Nations, Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7);
And in the matter of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (UNGA Resolution 2625, 1970);
And in the matter of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1;
And in the matter of customary international law on non‑intervention and sovereign equality.
Between
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
… Applicant
And
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
… Respondent
JUDGMENT
A. Introduction: The Question Before the Court
[1] The Russian Federation brings this application seeking declaratory relief. It does not seek damages. It does not seek an apology. It asks this Court to declare what the law already is: that the fate of a sovereign state is for its own people to determine, and that any systematic attempt by an external power to compel regime change through coercion, subversion, or the deployment of economic weapons aimed at the destruction of the state itself violates the fundamental norms of the international legal order.
[2] The United States of America denies that its policies constitute such an attempt. It characterises its sanctions, diplomatic measures, and information operations as lawful countermeasures in response to the Russian Federation’s international acts, including the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It submits that it seeks not the destruction of the Russian state but a change in its conduct.
[3] The Court must navigate between the Scylla of sovereign absolutism and the Charybdis of interventionist overreach. The law does not require the Court to pronounce upon the wisdom of either party’s policies. It requires the Court to identify the boundary that the Charter and customary international law have drawn between legitimate pressure and unlawful coercion.
B. The Factual and Legal Background
[4] The facts are largely matters of public record and are not in dispute between the Parties. Since February 2022, the Russian Federation has been engaged in an armed conflict in Ukraine. The United States and its allies have imposed a comprehensive regime of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military support for Ukraine. Senior officials of the Respondent State have, on multiple occasions, expressed the hope or expectation that these measures would lead to political change within the Russian Federation, including the removal of the current leadership.
[5] On 8 July 2026, a prominent Russian businessman, Mr Andrey Melnichenko, gave an extensive interview to a Western publication in which he described several scenarios for Russia’s future, all of them characterised as bleak, ranging from vassalage to anarchy to autarky. The interview was conducted in Moscow. Mr Melnichenko did not call for foreign intervention. He called for internal reform.
[6] The Russian Federation contends that the cumulative effect of the Respondent’s policies, combined with the amplification of narratives of Russian collapse in Western media, constitutes a campaign of coercion aimed at overriding the sovereign will of the Russian people. The Respondent contends that it is exercising its lawful rights.
C. The Applicable Law
[7] The Charter of the United Nations is the constitution of the international community. Article 2(1) affirms the sovereign equality of all Member States. This principle is the Grundnorm [basic norm] of the international legal order. It entails the right of every state to choose its own political, economic, and social system without external interference.
[8] Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Article 2(7) prohibits intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. These provisions are not merely contractual obligations between states; they are jus cogens [peremptory norms] from which no derogation is permitted.
[9] The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations (1970), adopted by the General Assembly without a vote and reflecting customary international law, provides that “no State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” The Declaration further prohibits the organisation, instigation, financing, or assistance of subversive or terrorist activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the regime of another State.
[10] The right of self‑determination, enshrined in common Article 1 of the International Covenants on Human Rights, provides that “all peoples have the right freely to determine their political status.” This right vests in peoples, not governments. It is the legal expression of the proposition that a nation’s fate is for its own people to decide.
[11] The Constitution of the Russian Federation, Article 3, provides that “the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people.” This provision is a domestic reflection of the international norm. The people are the sovereign; the government is their agent.
[12] Economic sanctions, imposed in response to internationally wrongful acts, are lawful countermeasures provided they are proportionate, reversible, and directed at inducing compliance with international obligations. They are not a mandate for regime change. The distinction between measures directed at conduct and measures directed at the destruction of the state itself is a distinction of purpose and effect. It is, in many cases, a distinction that only history can draw with clarity.
D. Analysis and Findings
[13] The Court begins with what is clear. There is no right under international law for one state to overthrow the government of another. The prohibition on intervention, affirmed by this Court in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (1986), is absolute. A state may not organise, finance, or direct armed groups aimed at toppling a foreign government. It may not use economic measures as a weapon of compulsion directed at the political independence of another state. The Respondent’s own legal submissions accept these principles.
[14] The difficulty lies in the characterisation of the Respondent’s conduct. The Respondent has not invaded the Russian Federation. It has not armed insurgent groups on Russian soil. It has imposed economic sanctions and provided military assistance to Ukraine, a state that is defending itself against an armed attack by the Applicant. The provision of military assistance to a victim of aggression is not, in itself, an intervention in the internal affairs of the aggressor state.
[15] However, the Court cannot ignore the public statements of senior officials of the Respondent State. When the purpose of sanctions is expressed not merely as inducing compliance with international law but as achieving the removal of a foreign government, the character of those sanctions shifts. They cease to be countermeasures and become instruments of coercion aimed at the political independence of the target state. The law cannot police every statement of every official, but it can and does recognise a pattern. The Respondent would be well advised to ensure that its public pronouncements do not contradict the legal justifications it advances before this Court.
[16] The Court turns now to the role of the media. The Applicant has argued that Western media outlets have amplified narratives of Russian collapse in a manner that amounts to an information campaign aimed at destabilising the Russian Federation. The Court does not doubt that information operations exist. States have used propaganda since the dawn of organised politics. But the media, in a free society, is not an arm of the state. The Respondent cannot be held responsible for every article published by a private news organisation, however influential. The Applicant’s own domestic media is subject to state control; it cannot complain of bias abroad while enforcing uniformity at home.
[17] The Applicant has further argued that the public memory is short, that controversies are driven by media coverage, and that the Respondent exploits this cognitive vulnerability to maintain pressure on the Russian Federation. The Court is not a tribunal of cognitive science. It cannot rule on whether human memory lasts two weeks or two generations. It can only observe that the persistence of the controversy over Russia’s future—a controversy that long predates the current conflict and will long outlast it—suggests that some issues are not subject to the forgetting curve. The law of cause and effect operates on a timescale that no news cycle can capture.
[18] The most significant evidence before the Court is not the public statements of politicians or the headlines of newspapers. It is the interview given by Mr Melnichenko. A member of the Russian elite, living in Moscow, speaking to a foreign publication at considerable personal risk, articulated a vision of internal change. He did not call for American intervention. He did not ask for sanctions. He called for Russians to decide their own future. That interview is factum probatum [proven fact] of something that the law recognises: the internal dynamics of a state are the primary drivers of its political evolution. External pressure may influence the environment; it does not determine the outcome.
[19] The Court therefore holds that the Respondent’s policies, to the extent that they are directed at inducing compliance with international law and are proportionate to that objective, are lawful. To the extent that they are directed at the destruction of the Russian state or the overthrow of its government by external means, they would be unlawful. The line between the two is not always clear, and it is not for this Court to draw it in every case. It is sufficient to declare the principle. States must govern themselves accordingly.
E. Operative Part
[20] For these reasons, THE COURT,
(1) Declares that the principle of sovereign equality, enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Charter of the United Nations and forming part of customary international law, entails the right of every state to determine its own political, economic, and social system without external coercion;
(2) Declares that the prohibition on intervention in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, affirmed in the Declaration on Friendly Relations (1970) and in the judgment of this Court in Nicaragua v. United States of America, prohibits any state from organising, instigating, financing, or assisting activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the government of another state;
(3) Declares that economic sanctions imposed in response to internationally wrongful acts are lawful countermeasures provided they are proportionate, directed at inducing compliance with international obligations, and do not amount to measures of coercion aimed at the destruction of the target state or the overthrow of its government by external means;
(4) Declares that the right of self‑determination, enshrined in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and reflected in Article 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, vests in the people of each state, and that the ultimate determination of a state’s political trajectory is a matter for its own people;
(5) Finds that the Respondent’s policies, to the extent they are directed at the objectives described in paragraph (3) above, are not incompatible with the Charter; and declares that any policy, public statement, or measure that goes beyond those objectives and seeks the destruction of the Applicant state or the imposition of political change by external coercion would be incompatible with the Charter and contrary to international law;
(6) Rejects the Applicant’s claim that the Respondent’s sanctions regime, in its entirety, constitutes an unlawful intervention, on the ground that the Applicant has failed to discharge the onus probandi [burden of proof] that the Respondent’s measures are directed at the destruction of the Russian state rather than at inducing compliance with international law;
(7) Calls upon both Parties to conduct their relations in accordance with the principles declared herein, and to refrain from any action or statement that would undermine the sovereign equality of states or the right of peoples to self‑determination.
[21] Courts do not decide the fate of nations. People do. The law sets the boundary: no force, no coercion. Inside that boundary, Karma operates. What is sown by state, media, and citizen is reaped by history. The truth, once it emerges, cannot be hidden. It will be shouted from the rooftops. And in this case, the rooftop is in Moscow.
Done in English and French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this ninth day of July, two thousand and twenty‑six.
Sgd.
(President of the International Court of Justice)
