PART III OF III — FROM HISTORICAL GRIEVANCE TO CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY
For Publication: 15 September 2026
Commentary & Analysis
Borneo’s Plight in Malaysia Foundation (BoPiMaFo)
Tomorrow Malaysia turns sixty-three.
For two days we have examined the foundations of Malaysia.
Part I asked what actually occurred in North Borneo in 1963 and why internal self-government must be distinguished from the wider question of international sovereignty.
Part II showed that Malaysia’s own Federal Court has recorded that at least one safeguard arising from the Inter-Governmental Committee arrangements was never implemented.
The question now is no longer merely:
WHAT WENT WRONG?
The more important question is:
WHAT SHOULD SABAH AND SARAWAK DO NOW?
BoPiMaFo believes the answer cannot be another round of speeches about “restoring MA63”.
We need evidence.
We need a programme.
We need enforcement.
And ultimately, we need a Malaysian constitutional settlement capable of surviving another sixty years.
FIRST: CONDUCT A COMPLETE MA63 AND IGC COMPLIANCE AUDIT
Sabah’s case must be built with documents, not slogans.
Some rights are expressly contained in the Federal Constitution.
Some arise from MA63.
Some appear in the IGC Report.
Some were political assurances.
Some were later legislated.
Some may have been modified.
Some may never have been implemented.
The first task must therefore be a comprehensive audit covering MA63, the IGC Report, the Federal Constitution, the Sabah Constitution, financial arrangements, immigration safeguards, Borneonisation, parliamentary representation and subsequent constitutional amendments affecting Sabah.
For every provision, ask:
What was promised?
How was it implemented?
Was it fully implemented?
Was it later altered?
Was Sabah’s consent obtained where required?
Does the right continue today?
And if it was never implemented, why not?
The final report should be published.
No slogans.
No selective quotations.
DOCUMENTS.
SECOND: PROTECT SABAH’S SECURITY, CITIZENSHIP AND ELECTORAL INTEGRITY
Security was fundamental to the case for Malaysia.
Sabah’s special immigration safeguards were intended to protect its distinctive position.
Yet Sabah subsequently experienced mass undocumented immigration and the controversy surrounding what became known as Project IC.
These matters were serious enough for the Federal Government to establish a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Immigrants in Sabah.
Immigration, identity documentation, citizenship and the electoral roll cannot permanently be treated as separate issues.
If foreigners were improperly documented as citizens and later entered Sabah’s electoral roll, the consequences go far beyond immigration.
They affect political representation itself.
Sabah therefore needs a comprehensive Security and Demographic Integrity Audit examining:
the implementation of immigration safeguards;
the findings of the RCI;
the improper issuance of identity documents where established;
the relationship between questionable documentation and electoral registration;
and the integrity of Sabah’s electoral roll.
This is not hostility towards migrants.
It is about citizenship and democracy.
Every lawful citizen has an equal right to vote.
But:
NO UNLAWFUL VOTE SHOULD CANCEL THE LAWFUL VOTE OF A SABAHAN.
THIRD: PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS OF SABAH’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
The Federal Constitution recognises the natives of Sabah.
Article 161A forms part of the special constitutional framework concerning the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, while Article 153 safeguards their special position together with the legitimate interests of other communities.
That matters because demographic change ultimately affects political power.
Political power determines government, land policy, resource policy, native customary rights, development priorities and Sabah’s constitutional future.
Article 161A does not guarantee permanent electoral dominance to any community.
Nor should it.
But there is a fundamental difference between lawful demographic change and political dilution caused by unlawful citizenship or electoral manipulation.
If foreigners were unlawfully inserted into the citizenship system and subsequently into the electoral roll, the electoral influence of Sabah’s indigenous peoples could be artificially diluted.
That question deserves investigation.
There is also an international dimension.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognises principles concerning indigenous self-determination, participation in decision-making, culture, traditional institutions, lands, territories and resources.
Sabah’s indigenous peoples must therefore have meaningful participation in decisions affecting their political future, native lands and resources.
They must not become politically marginalised in their ancestral homeland through illegality.
That is not racial supremacy.
It is constitutional legality, electoral integrity and indigenous justice.
FOURTH: SETTLE THE 40 PER CENT ENTITLEMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION
Sabah must stop approaching constitutional entitlements as though they were federal generosity.
Articles 112C and 112D and the Tenth Schedule are constitutional provisions.
The 40 per cent entitlement is not the same thing as annual federal development spending.
One is a constitutional financial entitlement.
The other is ordinary governmental expenditure.
The future arrangement should provide for:
a transparent method of calculation;
publication of relevant federal revenue figures;
regular reviews;
payment within prescribed periods;
and an independent mechanism when Sabah and the Federal Government cannot agree.
The principle should be simple:
CALCULATE IT.
PUBLISH IT.
PAY IT.
This also goes directly to Sabah’s development position.
Sabah possesses oil, gas, timber, land, agriculture, fisheries, minerals and immense maritime resources.
Yet it remains the Malaysian State with the highest incidence of absolute poverty.
That contradiction requires an accounting.
How much wealth has Sabah contributed?
How much federal revenue has been derived from Sabah?
What was Sabah constitutionally entitled to receive?
How much was actually returned?
Sabah’s own governments must also answer for corruption, waste and poor governance.
But local failures do not erase federal constitutional obligations.
Both can be true.
A federation cannot treat Sabah’s resources as national wealth when they leave Sabah while treating Sabah’s poverty merely as a State problem when the consequences return.
FIFTH: RESTORE BORNEONISATION AND MEANINGFUL BORNEO REPRESENTATION
More than sixty years after Malaysia’s formation, Sabah should demand a complete audit of Borneonisation.
How many senior positions in federal departments operating in Sabah are held by Sabahans?
Which departments fulfilled the original objective?
Which did not?
After sixty-three years, “eventually” cannot remain the timetable.
The parliamentary balance must also be revisited.
Sabah and Sarawak themselves did not hold 35 per cent of Parliament in 1963.
But together with Singapore, the territories outside the former Federation of Malaya held approximately one-third.
That created an important constitutional blocking balance.
Singapore’s departure destroyed it.
Sabah and Sarawak should therefore seriously pursue at least 35 per cent collective parliamentary representation, together with special consent mechanisms for amendments affecting fundamental features of the 1963 settlement.
A partnership loses meaning if one side can permanently rewrite its foundations without the effective consent of the others.
SIXTH: SABAH AND SARAWAK NEED A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT
Sabah should convene a broadly representative Constitutional Convention involving constitutional lawyers, historians, indigenous organisations, native leaders, civil society, academics, professional bodies, youth, women and communities throughout Sabah.
Its task should be to answer one question:
WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE FEDERATION DOES SABAH WANT FOR THE NEXT SIXTY YEARS?
That may involve stronger federalism, asymmetric autonomy, confederal-style arrangements or a new constitutional compact.
We should use the word “confederation” carefully.
MA63 did not itself create a legal confederation.
Malaysia remains constitutionally a federation.
But Sabah and Sarawak are entirely entitled to propose a more decentralised future arrangement.
The label matters less than the substance.
Sabah and Sarawak must also coordinate.
Putrajaya can easily dismiss fragmented voices.
It is much harder to disregard a coherent Borneo constitutional position.
SEVENTH: INTERNATIONALISE THE ISSUE SERIOUSLY
International law must not be used as a slogan.
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541 form part of the historical framework of decolonisation and self-determination.
UNDRIP adds the modern indigenous-rights dimension.
None automatically invalidates Malaysia.
None automatically creates a unilateral right of secession.
But they raise legitimate questions:
Was North Borneo’s political future freely determined?
What alternatives were available?
Was integration based upon equality?
How were the wishes of the population ascertained?
What happens if safeguards central to participation were never implemented or subsequently eroded?
These questions should be studied alongside the Cobbold Commission, the IGC Report, the UN Malaysia Mission, MA63 and British declassified records.
Internationalisation should mean presenting a documented case to jurists, academics, parliamentarians, indigenous-rights institutions, civil society and appropriate United Nations mechanisms.
Not theatrics.
Evidence.
EIGHTH: NEGOTIATE ONE PACKAGE — WITH DEADLINES AND ENFORCEMENT
After the compliance audit and Constitutional Convention, Sabah should present Putrajaya with one consolidated proposal.
Not twenty disconnected demands.
One package.
A New Malaysian Constitutional Compact.
It should address:
outstanding MA63 safeguards;
security and demographic integrity;
indigenous rights;
the 40 per cent entitlement;
Borneonisation;
taxation and revenue autonomy;
resource governance;
petroleum;
territorial and maritime matters;
Labuan;
representation;
education;
administrative autonomy;
and mechanisms preventing unilateral erosion of agreed powers.
Every obligation should have a timetable.
Every financial entitlement should have a calculation mechanism.
Every safeguard should have enforcement.
Malaysia cannot discuss MA63 forever.
NO MORE ENDLESS MA63 TALKS WITHOUT DEADLINES, IMPLEMENTATION DATES AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS.
Ultimately, the people must also have a say.
Any fundamental restructuring of Sabah’s constitutional relationship should possess democratic legitimacy.
Politicians cannot endlessly negotiate Sabah’s future behind closed doors and present the result as a fait accompli.
A BETTER MALAYSIA IS STILL POSSIBLE
This is not about hating Malaya.
Ordinary people in Peninsular Malaysia did not negotiate MA63.
Nor should Sabah’s communities turn against one another.
The issue is not race or religion.
It is about constitutional rights, indigenous rights, historical performance and equality.
For sixty-three years Sabahans have asked:
What did Malaysia promise us?
Perhaps the questions must now change.
Do not merely ask:
WHAT DID SABAH LOSE?
Ask:
WHAT CAN BE RESTORED?
Do not merely ask:
WHO BETRAYED SABAH?
Ask:
WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE WILL PREVENT FUTURE BETRAYAL?
Do not merely ask:
HOW MUCH DEVELOPMENT MONEY DID SABAH RECEIVE?
Ask:
WHAT WAS SABAH ENTITLED TO RECEIVE?
Do not merely ask:
WHY DID SABAH’S DEMOGRAPHY CHANGE SO DRAMATICALLY?
Ask:
WERE SABAH’S SECURITY, CITIZENSHIP AND ELECTORAL SAFEGUARDS FAITHFULLY PROTECTED?
And do not merely ask:
SHOULD MA63 BE RESTORED?
Ask:
WHAT NEW CONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENT CAN PREVENT THE SAME FAILURES FROM HAPPENING AGAIN?
Tomorrow Malaysians will raise their flags.
We should too.
But patriotism does not require historical amnesia.
A federation confident in its legitimacy should not fear its founding documents.
Open them.
Audit them.
Implement what remains binding.
Restore what has been improperly eroded.
Renegotiate what no longer works.
Protect Sabah’s constitutional and indigenous rights.
And build a federation in which Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya meet not through dominance and dependence, but through dignity and genuine partnership.
Malaysia must not survive merely because an agreement was signed in 1963.
Malaysia deserves to survive because the peoples who constitute it continue to believe the bargain is fair.
That is the unfinished work of Malaysia.
And that should be Sabah’s mission after sixty-three years.
SELAMAT HARI Malaysia’s.
