By Angie S Chin The Vote Wisely Project Sabah
KOTA KINABALU: As of May 2026, the uncomfortable truth about Sabah’s 40% constitutional entitlement is this:
Legally, Sabah is winning.
Tactically, Putrajaya is controlling the game.
Politically, Sabah is still not using its full leverage.
The Court of Appeal’s decision on 6 April 2026 to grant a Stay of Execution dramatically shifted momentum back to the Federal Government. The High Court’s 180-day deadline — which once imposed urgency and accountability — is now effectively frozen.
The clock has stopped.
No immediate pressure.
No legal consequences.
No urgency to conclude negotiations.
Putrajaya argued that calculating Sabah’s 40% entitlement is historically and financially complex, and that immediate enforcement could affect federal finances. The court accepted that reasoning.
As a result, delay is no longer merely political. It is now institutionalised.
Negotiations can continue quietly behind closed doors, away from public scrutiny and without the pressure of a court-supervised timeline.
Yet beneath all the legal manoeuvring lies one crucial fact many Malaysians still fail to grasp: The Federal Government never denied Sabah’s constitutional right to the 40%.
Never. They acknowledge it.
The dispute was never about whether the right exists. Instead, the arguments is now focused on timelines, enforcement mechanisms, and procedures.
And even on those issues, Putrajaya lost at the High Court.
The October 2025 judgment remains one of the most politically significant constitutional rulings in recent Sabah history. The court ruled that the Federal Government acted unlawfully by failing to review Sabah’s special grant for 48 years.
Forty-eight years. Let that sink in.
That finding alone should have triggered a national reckoning.
Because this is not a dispute over federal generosity. It is a question of constitutional compliance.
Article 112C is not charity. It is not discretionary aid. It is not a political gift dependent on goodwill from Kuala Lumpur.
It is a constitutional obligation embedded within the Malaysia Agreement framework.
And this is where the political frustration among Sabahans continues to grow.
On paper, Sabah should possess enormous leverage today.
GRS is part of the Federal Unity Government. Sabah MPs remain crucial to federal political stability. A General Election looms closer with every passing month.
This should be Sabah’s strongest bargaining moment in decades, no?
Yet what Sabahans continue to witness are incremental payments, carefully managed announcements that sounds too good to be true, and endless closed-door negotiations that produce little visible progress toward full constitutional implementation.
Which raises a difficult but increasingly unavoidable question: If Sabah’s strongest political leverage still cannot produce decisive movement on the 40% issue, then what exactly is that leverage being used for?
Because leverage only matters when it is exercised.
Some leaders repeatedly argue that Malaysia’s financial position must be considered before Sabah’s entitlement can be fully implemented.
But that argument itself deserves scrutiny.
Article 112D already requires the review process to consider both the Federal Government’s financial position and Sabah’s needs. The Constitution does not say Sabah should only receive what Putrajaya is “comfortable” paying.
In fact, the wording goes further. The review must endeavour to ensure Sabah has adequate revenue not only to maintain current services, but also to allow reasonable expansion of those services.
That is a constitutional benchmark. And Sabahans are entitled to ask whether that benchmark is genuinely being met today.
Because if roads across Sabah remain riddled with potholes, if water disruptions continue affecting communities, and if basic infrastructure gaps persist after decades of federal revenue collection, then serious questions must be asked about whether the current arrangement is constitutionally adequate at all.
The “needs of the State” are not symbolic language. They are part of the legal formula.
Equally frustrating for many Sabahans is the continued framing of Putrajaya’s appeal as though it were an unavoidable legal necessity.
Yes, the Federal Government has the right to appeal. But it also has the right to withdraw that appeal tomorrow if genuine political sincerity exists.
Appealing is a choice. Not an obligation.
And when some ask why the 40% issue should still be debated openly in the State Assembly when “everyone already agrees” Sabah has the right, they miss the point entirely.
The debate is no longer about proving the entitlement exists. The debate is about transparency.
What revenue figures are being used?
What formula is being negotiated?
What exactly has been offered?
What timelines exist?
Why does the process remain so opaque even after decades?
A formal State Assembly debate would do more than create headlines. It would strengthen Sabah’s negotiating mandate and demonstrate that this is not merely a private discussion among political elites.
It is a constitutional demand backed by public expectation.
Many Sabahans do not need opposition politicians or cybertroopers to tell them something feels wrong. Its right there in front of us.
They can observe.
They can compare.
They can think independently.
And after weighing the legal realities, political sensitivities, and practical constraints involved, many are still arriving at the same conclusion:
Sabah’s progress on the 40% constitutional issue should be far more decisive, far more transparent, and far more urgent than what the public is currently being asked to accept.
