By Remy Majangkim (Majangkim Office)
KOTA KINABALU: When the “Government of the Day” stands before the people to announce an “interim” grant, they are not merely distributing funds; they are engaging in a calculated act of displacement.
They are displacing the Constitutional Covenant of 1963 with the Political Calculus of 2026.
This is not governance; it is a “sales pitch” that relies on the hope that the public will confuse a momentary gesture with a permanent constitutional obligation.
The Federal Constitution Reigns Supreme
It is a dangerous precedent to allow the executive branch of the government to define the scope of Sabah’s rights.
The 40% revenue entitlement is not a policy matter subject to the changing whims of ministers or cabinet decisions; it is an obligation enshrined in the Federal Constitution (Article 112C and the Tenth Schedule) and protected under the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63).
In our legal system, the Federal Constitution reigns supreme. When a minister declares a “new formula” for the 40% entitlement, they are attempting to subordinate a constitutional mandate to administrative convenience.
The law does not recognize “interim” payments as a substitute for constitutional compliance. A government can change, and a Prime Minister can change, but the constitutional covenant of 1963 remains the permanent, binding bedrock of our federation.
The “Moving Goalpost” Syndrome
We are currently witnessing a “moving goalpost” syndrome—where the rules are redefined in every press release. By framing the entitlement as a negotiable variable, the federal administration ensures that the conversation remains trapped in a cycle of “interim” announcements.
They treat our sovereign rights as a product to be sold, rather than an obligation to be honored. This constant shifting of terms is designed to exhaust the public’s memory of the original intent.
The Breach of Constitutional Procedure
The most egregious aspect of this “new formula” is its unilateral nature.
Because the 40% entitlement is a treaty-based obligation, any adjustment or interpretation of that formula requires the participation of all signatories to the original agreement.
By presenting a “new formula” between the Federal Government and the state government without the collective validation of all original parties, the administration is bypassing the very legal framework that ensures Sabah’s rights.
To move the goalposts without a multi-signatory review is to ignore the constitutional integrity of the agreement itself. This is not the implementation of a treaty—it is an attempt to rewrite it unilaterally, which renders the current formula a constitutional nullity.
The PMX 2.0 Horizon: A Risk Assessment
As the federal administration looks toward its next phase (PMX 2.0), the reliance on “interim” payments is a strategy built on shifting sands. Interim payments are, by definition, placeholders.
They are the arithmetic of political convenience, not the foundation of a stable federation. A government that seeks to define its legacy by repeating these interim cycles fails to recognize the systemic risk it is creating.
The longer the federal government avoids a transparent, automated, and constitutional fiscal framework, the more it undermines the constitutional trust that holds the nation together.
Conclusion: Sovereignty is Not a Variable
The RM1.5 billion may satisfy the political cycle, but it does not satisfy the constitutional requirement.
We must move beyond the “salesman’s” debate of how much is being given and return to the integrity of the formula itself.
The legacy of Zainal Ajamain reminds us that our rights are not gifts to be granted, but obligations to be fulfilled.
The Federal Constitution exists to protect these rights from the caprice of daily politics. Until the federal government invites all signatories back to the table to honor the original 1963 intent, every “interim” announcement will remain what it has always been: an illusion of progress in the face of constitutional neglect.
