By: Lesaya Sorudim
KOTA KINABALU: The central question is not whether Sabah’s 40% revenue demand *can* be met before the next General Election.
The real question is whether the Federal Government is willing to honour what is already enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
For decades, this issue has been mischaracterised as a matter of fiscal capacity—whether Putrajaya can “afford” to return 40% of the revenue it derives from Sabah.
This framing is fundamentally flawed. The 40% entitlement is not a discretionary grant, not a goodwill payment, and certainly not a policy option subject to shifting economic conditions. It is a constitutional formula: for every ringgit collected by the Federal Government from Sabah, 40 sen must be returned. This is not generosity—it is compliance with the law.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeal Malaysia to stay the High Court’s order has effectively reset progress.
By removing a binding timeline, Sabah is once again left at the mercy of political negotiation rather than legal enforcement.
And history has shown that when constitutional rights are left to political will, delay becomes the default, not the exception.
This moment therefore demands clarity and courage from Sabah’s own political leadership.
Sabah leaders must decide whether to align themselves with Putrajaya’s line of thinking—treating the 40% as negotiable, conditional, or dependent on federal finances—or to take a firm stand rooted in constitutional principle.
This is not merely a policy choice; it is a defining test of leadership.
To accept the Federal Government’s framing is to concede that Sabah’s rights are flexible and open to dilution.
It risks turning a constitutional entitlement into a bargaining chip. But to stand firmly on constitutional ground is to affirm that the 40% entitlement is non-negotiable—a right that must be implemented, not debated.
Can the 40% be met before the next General Election?
Technically, yes—if there is political will. Constitutionally, it should—because the obligation already exists. But politically, it will only happen if Sabah’s leaders speak with unity and insistence.
And if it is not met before the next General Election, then the responsibility shifts to the people.
Sabah voters must think carefully about which political parties are truly committed—and capable—of defending and securing this constitutional right.
The ballot box then becomes more than a democratic exercise; it becomes a judgment on who has the resolve to stand for Sabah.
Ultimately, this is not about affordability—it is about accountability. Sabah’s 40% is not a request. It is not a favour. It is a constitutional debt long overdue.
The question now is no longer whether it can be paid—but who is willing to ensure that it is.
