DONALD STEPHENS WARNED AGAINST SABAH BECOMING MERELY ANOTHER STATE OF MALAYA. SIXTY-THREE YEARS LATER, SABAHANS MUST ASK WHETHER HIS FEARS CAME TRUE.
By DANIEL JOHN JAMBUN, President Borneo’s Plight in Malaysia Foundation (BoPiMaFo Inc.)
KOTA KINABALU: Every 31 August, Malaysians are encouraged to celebrate “Hari Merdeka” as though the entire Federation of Malaysia achieved independence on that date in 1957.
It did not.
On 31 August 1957, the Federation of Malaya achieved independence from Britain.
Sabah was not part of Malaya.
Sarawak was not part of Malaya.
Singapore was not part of Malaya.
Malaysia did not yet exist.
The Federation of Malaysia came into existence only on 16 September 1963.
That distinction is not anti-Malaysia.
It is historical fact.
And after more than six decades, Sabahans and Sarawakians should have the confidence to insist that the history of this Federation be told correctly.
31 AUGUST 1957 WAS THE INDEPENDENCE OF MALAYA
31 August 1957 was unquestionably a great and historic day for the people of the Federation of Malaya.
Malaya achieved independence from British colonial rule.
Malaya has every right to commemorate and celebrate that achievement.
Sabahans and Sarawakians can respect that history.
But respecting Malaya’s history does not require us to surrender our own.
There was no Federation of Malaysia on 31 August 1957.
There could therefore have been no independence of Malaysia on that date.
The problem is not the celebration of Merdeka.
The problem arises when Malaya’s independence story is gradually presented as though it were the constitutional birth story of Sabah and Sarawak as well.
It was not.
MALAYSIA CAME SIX YEARS LATER
The Malaysia project arose later.
It involved negotiations concerning the already independent Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and, at an earlier stage, Brunei.
Contemporary records described the proposed Federation of Malaysia as embracing these separate territories. The Cobbold Commission materials, for example, recorded the British and Malayan governments’ proposal for a federation embracing the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.
The distinction was obvious:
Malaya already existed as a federation.
North Borneo existed outside it.
Sarawak existed outside it.
Singapore existed outside it.
Malaysia was therefore a subsequent constitutional creation.
On 16 September 1963, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore entered the new Malaysian constitutional arrangement together with the Federation of Malaya.
That is why 16 September is Malaysia Day.
SABAH DID NOT SIMPLY JOIN MALAYA
This must be understood clearly by younger Sabahans.
North Borneo was not negotiating merely to become another ordinary state of the Federation of Malaya.
Indeed, one of Sabah’s most important founding leaders explicitly rejected such an idea.
Donald Stephens wrote on 18 July 1961 that the Borneo territories should first be federated, after which it would be possible to consider Tunku Abdul Rahman’s wider plan.
He described what he envisaged as:
“the federation of two Federations.”
More importantly, Stephens objected directly to the suggestion that the Borneo territories should simply become additional states of Malaya.
He urged that the idea of Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo becoming merely the 12th, 13th and 14th states of the Federation of Malaya be abandoned.
His meaning was unmistakable.
Stephens was looking for partnership, not absorption.
He wanted Borneo to possess its own political strength before entering a wider relationship with Malaya.
In modern political language, what Stephens contemplated was much closer to a confederal or highly decentralised federal arrangement than the heavily centralised federation Malaysia subsequently became.
DONALD STEPHENS SAW THE DANGER FROM THE BEGINNING
Stephens’ early position deserves far greater attention in Sabah today.
He feared that North Borneo might exchange one form of colonial dependency for another form of political dependency.
He wanted the Borneo territories to achieve self-government and political strength.
He wanted Borneo to negotiate with Malaya as a partner.
He did not want Sabah simply swallowed into an enlarged Malayan federation.
Stephens eventually supported Malaysia.
But he supported Malaysia after negotiations concerning safeguards, autonomy and the constitutional position of North Borneo.
That context is essential.
It explains why Sabah demanded protections concerning immigration, religion, land, native affairs, Borneonisation, finance, representation and constitutional amendments.
If Sabah was simply entering Malaya as an ordinary state, why were these safeguards necessary?
They were necessary because Sabah’s leaders understood that they were entering a much larger political arrangement and needed protection against domination.
WAS DONALD STEPHENS PLAYED OUT?
This is the uncomfortable question Sabahans should now have the courage to ask.
Stephens’ preferred Borneo federation did not materialise.
Instead, North Borneo proceeded into Malaysia together with Sarawak and Singapore.
Then, barely two years later, Singapore left Malaysia in 1965.
The political arithmetic changed dramatically.
Sabah and Sarawak were suddenly left confronting the overwhelming demographic and parliamentary weight of the former Federation of Malaya.
And contemporary diplomatic records show that, by October 1965, Stephens was already associated with the position of seeking greater Sabah autonomy within a looser federation.
That is extraordinarily significant.
Only two years after Malaysia was formed, one of Sabah’s principal founding leaders was already looking again towards a looser constitutional relationship with Kuala Lumpur.
Stephens had begun in 1961 by warning against North Borneo becoming merely another Malayan state.
After Malaysia was created, he again found himself confronting the question of Sabah’s autonomy.
We must therefore ask:
Was Donald Stephens’ original vision gradually played out of the constitutional settlement?
Did Sabah enter Malaysia expecting one relationship, only to discover another emerging in practice?
“WE WERE CHEATED AND FOOLED”
Stephens was later reported as having lamented that Sabahans had been **“cheated and fooled”** in entering the Federation.
Whether one concentrates on those precise attributed words or on his documented political trajectory, the underlying message is difficult to escape.
Stephens originally feared domination.
He initially wanted the Borneo territories strengthened before entering a wider arrangement.
He spoke of a “federation of two Federations”.
He rejected the idea that North Borneo should simply become another state of Malaya.
He later accepted Malaysia on the expectation of safeguards.
And within two years of Malaysia’s formation, historical diplomatic records were already describing him as favouring greater autonomy within a looser federation.
That history should make every Sabahan think.
Perhaps Stephens realised that the Malaysia which developed was not entirely the Malaysia he had originally imagined.
LEE KUAN YEW ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT MALAYSIA WOULD CHANGE THE POLITICAL EQUATION
Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew approached Malaysia from Singapore’s own strategic interests.
Singapore faced questions of independence, security, communism, economic survival and its political future.
But Singapore’s participation also had enormous implications for the internal political balance of Malaysia.
The entry of Singapore together with Sabah and Sarawak meant that Malaysia could not simply be treated conceptually as the old Federation of Malaya with a few territories attached.
A wider federation was being created.
Singapore’s departure in 1965 profoundly altered that balance.
The Borneo territories lost an important part of the non-Malayan parliamentary and demographic counterweight within the Federation.
Sabah and Sarawak remained.
Malaya’s eleven states remained.
But the balance created in September 1963 had fundamentally changed.
FROM PARTNERSHIP TO CENTRALISATION
The constitutional tragedy of Sabah did not necessarily happen through one single dramatic act.
It occurred gradually.
Federal political and administrative power became increasingly concentrated in Kuala Lumpur and later Putrajaya.
The public understanding of Malaysia also changed.
Instead of Malaysia being viewed as a federation created in 1963 from distinct political territories, an increasingly simple narrative took hold:
Malaya became Malaysia.
Sabah and Sarawak joined.
Kuala Lumpur became the centre.
Sabah and Sarawak became two states among thirteen.
That narrative may be convenient.
But historically, it is deeply incomplete.
Johor, Selangor, Perak, Kedah, Kelantan and the other Peninsular states were already components of the Federation of Malaya before Malaysia existed.
Sabah and Sarawak were not.
That difference matters.
THE SAFEGUARDS WERE NOT GIFTS
Sabah did not enter Malaysia empty-handed.
Its constitutional position carried significant protections.
Immigration autonomy.
Jurisdiction over land.
Native law and customs.
Special financial arrangements.
Borneonisation.
Constitutional safeguards.
State representation.
These were not favours generously bestowed by Kuala Lumpur.
They were part of the political bargain surrounding Sabah’s participation in Malaysia.
A gift can be withdrawn.
A negotiated constitutional safeguard is an obligation.
That distinction must be understood.
WHAT HAPPENED TO THE BARGAIN?
After sixty-three years, Sabahans are entitled to ask whether the bargain has been honoured.
What happened to Borneonisation?
What happened to balanced economic development?
What happened to Sabah’s political weight?
What happened to Sabah’s control over its resources?
What happened to our oil and gas?
What happened to our territorial waters?
What happened to our constitutional entitlement to 40 per cent of the net revenue derived by the Federation from Sabah?
What happened to the security assurances made to Sabah?
How did Sabah reach the situation where more than one million non-citizens live within the state while generations of indigenous Sabahans worry about the dilution of their demographic and electoral position?
These questions are not ancient history.
They concern Sabah’s survival as a meaningful political community.
A RESOURCE-RICH STATE SHOULD NOT REMAIN POOR
Sabah possesses enormous natural wealth.
Oil.
Gas.
Timber.
Plantation land.
Minerals.
Marine resources.
Strategic territory.
Yet Sabah has endured poverty, deteriorating roads, unreliable water supplies, electricity shortages, inadequate infrastructure and dilapidated schools.
For decades, Sabah’s resources have contributed enormously to the wider Federation.
Yet Sabah remains significantly behind Sarawak and much of Peninsular Malaysia in development.
Why?
At some point we must stop accepting explanations and start examining the structure itself.
A constitutional federation must be judged not merely by what is written on paper but by what it delivers to its constituent territories.
POLITICAL POWER IS THE ULTIMATE SAFEGUARD
Sabah and Sarawak can possess a hundred assurances.
They can possess memoranda.
They can possess constitutional provisions.
They can possess political declarations.
But unless Borneo possesses sufficient political power to defend those safeguards, they will always remain vulnerable.
Singapore’s departure altered the original parliamentary balance.
Sabah and Sarawak today do not possess sufficient parliamentary representation by themselves to guarantee that fundamental constitutional changes cannot be imposed by an overwhelmingly Peninsular majority.
This must be reconsidered.
Sabah and Sarawak should demand a meaningful constitutional blocking mechanism.
That could include restoration of at least one-third parliamentary representation for the Borneo territories, or another constitutionally entrenched mechanism ensuring that fundamental features of the Malaysia compact cannot be altered without Sabah and Sarawak’s consent.
That is not separatism.
That is constitutional protection.
PERHAPS STEPHENS WAS RIGHT THE FIRST TIME
Perhaps the most important lesson of 31 August 2026 is this:
Donald Stephens’ earliest instinct may have been wiser than generations of Sabahans were taught to believe.
A strong Borneo should have negotiated with Malaya from a position of equality.
Stephens envisaged the Borneo territories federating first.
He contemplated a wider arrangement described as a “federation of two Federations.”
That vision disappeared.
What followed instead was increasingly strong federal centralisation.
Today, therefore, discussing a confederal Malaysia should not be dismissed as radical or anti-national.
It is rooted in the earliest debates over Malaysia itself.
WHAT WOULD A CONFEDERAL MALAYSIA MEAN?
A confederal or substantially restructured Malaysian arrangement does not necessarily mean destroying Malaysia.
It could mean rebuilding it.
Defence could remain shared.
Foreign affairs could remain coordinated.
Currency and certain common institutions could remain national.
But Sabah and Sarawak could exercise far greater control over:
their natural resources;
oil and gas;
taxation and revenues;
economic development;
education;
health;
infrastructure;
territorial waters;
energy;
immigration;
and internal administration.
The purpose would not be hostility toward Malaya.
The purpose would be to create a relationship in which Sabah, Sarawak and Malaya possess sufficient constitutional space to manage their own affairs while cooperating where common interests require it.
That would be much closer to genuine partnership.
31 AUGUST SHOULD NOT ERASE 16 SEPTEMBER
There is nothing wrong with Sabahans congratulating our brothers and sisters in Malaya on 31 August.
Freedom from colonialism deserves celebration.
But historical respect must run both ways.
31 August 1957 was the independence day of the Federation of Malaya.
16 September 1963 was the day Malaysia came into existence.
Those are two separate historical events.
Acknowledging the difference does not weaken Malaysia.
A mature federation should be capable of telling its history truthfully.
What weakens Malaysia is demanding that Sabah and Sarawak forget their own constitutional history in order to fit comfortably into a Malaya-centred national narrative.
TWO DATES. TWO HISTORIES. ONE QUESTION FOR THE FUTURE.
31 August belongs proudly to Malaya’s independence.
16 September belongs to the establishment of Malaysia.
Let us respect both.
But let us never confuse them.
Sabah did not become independent as part of Malaya in 1957.
Sabah did not negotiate merely to become another Malayan state.
Malaysia did not exist in 1957.
Donald Stephens initially wanted a stronger Borneo negotiating with Malaya from a position of equality.
He spoke of a “federation of two Federations.”
He warned against North Borneo simply becoming another state of the Federation of Malaya.
And later he was associated with the demand for greater Sabah autonomy within a looser Federation.
So sixty-three years later, the question Sabahans should ask is not merely:
What is left of MA63?
The bigger question is:
Was Donald Stephens right from the beginning?
Would Sabah have been better protected had Borneo first been politically strengthened and Malaysia subsequently constituted as a genuinely balanced association between Borneo and Malaya?
And if that opportunity was lost in 1963, is it now time to revisit the constitutional structure for the generations yet to come?
There is nothing disloyal about asking that question.
Malaysia does not belong only to Putrajaya.
Malaysia belongs equally to those whose territories made its creation possible.
Perhaps the greatest act of patriotism this 31 August is therefore not simply waving the Jalur Gemilang.
It is having the courage to tell the whole history behind it.
Happy Merdeka Day to the people of the Federation of Malaya.
And on 16 September:
Happy Malaysia Day to Sabah, Sarawak, Malaya — and to every Malaysian who believes that partnership must mean equality, not subordination.
