Awarded Without the Workforce: The Question Behind Sabah’s Delayed Projects

By Brendon Beliku, Chartered Member of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) Malaysia, writing independently on Sabah’s economic governance, labour policy, logistics, transport and regulatory affairs

KOTA KINABALU: On 16 November in Kota Samarahan, Works Minister Datuk Seri Alexander Nanta Linggi said something about public projects that is rarely put so directly. 

“Some contractors take on large projects without having sufficient workforce,” he said.

“They must be fully accountable for their responsibilities.” He was speaking of Sarawak, where 99 federal projects worth about RM12 billion are under way, but the point applies equally across the South China Sea.

Nanta was careful to note that delays have many causes, including land acquisition, site surveys, utility relocation and changes in project scope. 

He also pointed to shortcomings in contractors’ management, finances and handling of workers on site. 

The workforce problem, in other words, is not the only cause of delay. It is, however, the one that is most within a contractor’s control at the moment a bid is submitted.

-A Pattern Already on the Record-

The remarks echo what the ministry has said before. On 7 October, Deputy Works Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Maslan said that 77 percent of the Public Works Department’s sick projects were caused by weak contractor management, including insufficient manpower. 

That is a national figure, but Sabah has seen the same pattern on its largest project.

In November 2025, the Pan Borneo Highway Sabah was reported to be behind schedule, with Phase 1A at about 85 percent against a target of 94 percent. 

Land acquisition and utility relocation were among the reasons given, but so were shortages of workers and materials. 

The ministry responded by directing 35 contractors to extend working hours to between 10 and 12 hours a day. 

The project has since been reported to be 95 percent complete in October 2026 and contractors given until the end of the year.

Longer hours can recover lost time, but they do not answer whether the contractor had enough people for the job in the first place.

-Why Workforce Is a Delivery Risk, Not an Afterthought-

In most public tenders, a contractor’s finances, experience and pricing are examined closely before an award. Workforce capacity is often assessed more loosely, sometimes as a stated intention rather than a demonstrated fact. 

Yet a contractor that wins several large contracts at once may simply not have the supervisors, skilled trades and general workers to deliver them all on time.

In Sabah, this risk is sharper for two reasons. First, the state’s construction sector depends heavily on foreign labour, and access to that labour runs through approval processes that take time and cannot be compressed at short notice. 

A contractor that assumes workers will be available after the award may discover that mobilisation is slower than the project schedule allows. 

Second, Sabah’s own skilled trades, including welders, electricians and heavy equipment operators, are being drawn into a growing pipeline of oil and gas, industrial and infrastructure projects. 

Several large projects competing for the same limited pool of skilled people will not all be staffed at once.

None of these factors is unforeseeable. They can be tested before the award, rather than discovered afterwards.

-What Workforce Accountability Could Look Like-

Nanta noted that the ministry maintains a database of contractor capability, although it is not published. That database is a sound starting point. 

The following steps are offered as proposals for discussion.

First, require a workforce plan at the tender stage. For large projects, bidders should show the number of supervisors, skilled trades and general workers needed at each phase, how many are already employed, and how the remainder will be sourced, whether locally, through training or through foreign recruitment.

Second, test that plan against the contractor’s existing commitments. 

A contractor’s workforce should be assessed across all the public projects it currently holds, not project by project, so that the same workers are not counted twice.

Third, track manpower as a progress indicator. Monthly reports could compare actual headcount on site against the planned figure, giving agencies an early warning before a shortfall turns into a sick project.

Fourth, publish summary findings. The capability database need not be released in full, but a published summary of how capacity is assessed would build trust in the award process.

Fifth, link large awards to local training, so that each major Sabah project leaves behind more skilled Sabahans than it found.

These measures carry costs. 

More paperwork may discourage smaller contractors, and strict capacity tests may narrow competition. 

The requirements should therefore be scaled to project size, with the closest scrutiny reserved for the largest contracts, where delays cost the public most.

Nanta is right that contractors must be accountable. But accountability works best when it begins before the contract is signed. 

A project that is awarded without a workforce has, in practice, been awarded on a promise. Sabah’s experience suggests that promise should be tested first.

[Disclaimer]: The views, opinions and analyses expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policies or positions of the Jesselton Times, its editors, management or affiliated entities. This article is published for analytical and public discussion purposes and should not be construed as institutional commentary or endorsement. The views expressed are the author’s own and not those of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) Malaysia.

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