By Datuk Ts Dr. Hj Ramli Amir, former President of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport (CILT) Malaysia and Vice-President of CILT International for Southeast Asia
KOTA KINABALU: Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s articulation of a “New Sabah” agenda on the eve of the state election presents a federal vision to reshape the state’s governance around anti-corruption, collaborative development, and high governance standards.
However, this vision must be understood against the backdrop of the emergent “Sabah Turks” cohort—a younger, more assertive generation of leaders and voters. Their performance-based, rights-assertive politics creates a complex landscape of both alignment and tension between federal hopes and local expectations.
The “New Sabah” Proposition: Anti-Corruption and Collaborative Federalism
Anwar framed his vision in blunt terms, insisting Sabah must no longer “remain plagued by corruption and abuse of power.”
He positioned his coalition, Pakatan Harapan (PH), as a guarantor of governance integrity, despite its limited electoral footprint.
The core of his pitch was for a state government that would “work together and scrutinize all development” with the federal government to “realise the state’s vast potential.”
This message reflects continuity with his national anti-corruption narrative, which claims the recovery of RM15.5 billion in assets.
Anwar frames this as a multi-year process requiring “wisdom” and coalition consensus, acknowledging his government’s reliance on partners like Umno, BN, and Sabah’s Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS).
The “New Sabah” agenda’s substantive pillars
Infrastructure: Addressing chronic water, road, and electricity (“AJK”) issues through projects like the Ulu Padas Hydroelectric Dam and the Pan Borneo Highway.
MA63 Implementation: Fulfilling the Malaysia Agreement 1963, including the 40% revenue entitlement, additional parliamentary seats, and the return of electricity regulatory control to the state.
Anwar’s administration has backed this with significant financial commitment, allocating RM17 billion to Sabah in 2024 despite collecting only RM10 billion in revenue from the state. Technical negotiations on the complex 40% entitlement have also commenced, signalling a proactive federal approach.
Convergence with the “Sabah Turks” Agenda
The emergence of what has been termed the “Sabah Turks”—younger leaders spanning their 30s to early 50s across the political spectrum—represents more than a simple changing of the guard.
Unlike the older generation whose political careers were forged in the 1990s through personal networks and alignment with federal power structures, particularly following Umno’s entry into Sabah, this new cohort prioritizes tangible deliverables and solutions-driven governance over relationship-based politics.
At first glance, Anwar’s vision resonates strongly with the younger generation’s priorities:
Anti-Corruption&Performance: The emphasis on clean governance and tangible infrastructure delivery aligns perfectly with the “buat kerja” (get the job done) ethos that distinguishes the new cohort from the older, patronage-based politics.
Constitutional Rights: Anwar’s active pursuit of MA63 issues and his declaration of being “the only prime minister to successfully address all nine claims” validates the rights-assertive approach central to the “Sabah Turks” identity.
Strategic Concessions: The federal government’s decision not to appeal the substance of the High Court ruling on the 40% entitlement—framing it as “Sabah’s right”—was a critical concession to Sabahan sentiment, particularly for a generation that has made fiscal justice a cornerstone of its politics.
Tensions and Trust Deficits
Despite these alignments, significant tensions complicate the “New Sabah” vision’s credibility.
Paternalism vs. Local Agency: Anwar’s assertion that PH will ensure “high governance standards” despite contesting few seats risks appearing paternalistic. The younger generation demands local agency and views autonomy as the foundation for self-determined development, not federal oversight.
The Hedged Commitment on MA63: While the federal government did not appeal the substance of the 40% ruling, it filed a partial appeal on the judgment’s reasoning. Though Anwar explained this was to protect past leaders from blanket condemnation, it generated deep scepticism.
For a generation demanding transparency, this procedural complexity reads as equivocation, creating fear that the entire case could be reopened, delaying implementation.
Rights vs. Negotiation: Anwar’s electoral calculus, which hinted at a preference for a “federal-friendly” and “reasonable” state government to facilitate a settlement,
fundamentally contradicts the younger generation’s framing of the 40% entitlement as a non-negotiable constitutional right.
The suggestion that Sabah’s rights are subject to political bargaining, rather than administrative execution of a court-validated obligation, is a major point of conflict.
The Coalition Partner Dilemma: Corruption allegations swirling around GRS—Anwar’s key Sabah ally—severely test the credibility of his anti-corruption drive. While Anwar insists enforcement agencies act professionally, the political necessity of maintaining coalition stability with GRS creates a perception of selective enforcement, undermining the “New Sabah” narrative for voters who prioritize consistent accountability.
Structural Constraints and the Performance Test
PH’s decision to contest only 22 seats reflects its limited grassroots presence, making the “New Sabah” agenda dependent on coalition partners whose priorities may diverge. The intensely fragmented political landscape—with dozens of parties contesting—means any resulting government will be a complex, potentially unstable arrangement, complicating coherent policy implementation.
Critically, the younger generation of voters—particularly the large bloc of fence-sitters—will judge the “New Sabah” on results, not rhetoric. They prioritize water and electricity access, infrastructure quality, and the cost of living.
This performance orientation creates intense accountability pressure that transcends the election. If negotiations on the 40% entitlement stall, if definitions of “net revenue” become contested, or if corruption allegations go unaddressed, the credibility of both Anwar and any state leaders who advocated cooperation will suffer.
The Federal Dilemma: Partnership or Control?
Underlying the “New Sabah” vision is an unresolved tension. Anwar’s promotion of Sabah to investors, his infrastructure commitments, and his MA63 efforts reflect genuine engagement. Yet, his language often reveals persistent centralist assumptions—positioning the federal government as a “guardian” and “standard-setter” coming to “look after the people.”
This contrasts sharply with the younger generation’s demand for a partnership of constitutional equals. The critical question is whether the federal government can accommodate this assertive partnership or whether bureaucratic inertia and political calculation will produce continued federal dominance cloaked in partnership rhetoric.
The former path could align federal and generational agendas for transformation; the latter will widen the trust deficit and empower more radical autonomist voices.
Conclusion: Aspiration Meets Accountability
Anwar Ibrahim’s “New Sabah” agenda articulates an aspirational vision of clean governance, collaborative development, and MA63 fulfillment that resonates rhetorically with the performance-based, rights-assertive politics championed by Sabah’s emerging younger generation.
The federal government’s infrastructure commitments, initiation of 40% entitlement negotiations, and anti-corruption messaging align with voter expectations for tangible delivery and constitutional justice.
Yet the credibility of this vision will be tested not in campaign speeches but in implementation. The younger cohort—both leaders and voters—demands measurable outcomes, transparent processes, and recognition of Sabah’s constitutional rights as obligations rather than negotiable political claims.
They evaluate governance through the lens of “buat kerja”: whether promises translate into functioning infrastructure, whether fiscal entitlements produce budgeted development, and whether partnerships respect autonomy rather than imposing federal oversight.
Anwar’s limited electoral footprint through PH, his dependence on coalition partners facing corruption allegations, and the structural ambiguities around the 40% entitlement appeal create risks that the “New Sabah” remains aspirational rhetoric rather than operational reality. If federal negotiations prove genuine, transparent, and expeditious—delivering clear implementation frameworks, honouring state autonomy, and holding coalition partners accountable for governance standards—the vision could catalyse the collaborative transformation Anwar envisions.
But if negotiations stall, if compromises dilute entitlements, or if political expedience trumps principled accountability, the gap between federal aspiration and Sabahan expectation will deepen, eroding trust in both Putrajaya and moderate state leaders who advocated cooperation.
Ultimately, the “New Sabah” will succeed or fail based on whether the federal government recognizes what the younger generation already understands: that Sabah’s future depends not on federal guardianship but on genuine partnership grounded in constitutional equality, fiscal justice, and respect for the state’s capacity to chart its own development path.
The election may determine which coalition governs Sabah, but the generational shift underway will determine whether any government—federal or state—can govern effectively without delivering the rights, resources, and autonomy that Sabahans increasingly understand as their birthright under MA63.
